OPCW Academic Forum
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1st Academic Forum

The CWC: Past Achievements and Future Challenges
A Review of the Main Conclusions of the OPCW Academic Forum
18-19 September, The Hague

Tim Sweijs
Nicole Chehin

At the occasion of the Tenth-year Anniversary of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), a diverse crowd of academics, diplomats and members of the NGO-community gathered in The Hague, to reflect on the achievements of the CWC and discuss the main challenges for the Organisation for the Prohibition of chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the years ahead. Rather than focusing solely on the CWC, participants of the Academic Forum took a broader view and considered a wide range of issues related to the role and function of the OPCW in the continuing attainment of the main objective of the CWC ‘to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons’. In doing so, they touched upon progress in chemical weapon destruction, proliferation of chemical agents and weapons, and advances in technology and science. In addition to providing input to the Second Review Conference, scheduled for April 2008, the Academic Forum provided for an excellent opportunity to create cross-cutting cleavages between practitioners and academics. Over the course of two days, the participants brought together a wide variety of perspectives in four simultaneously-ongoing workshops, which will be discussed below.

Over the last few decades, the terms of the discussion on the proliferation of chemical weapons have changed considerably. Whereas previously the discussion evolved around the question how to counter chemical weapons production, currently the main concern is the prevention of covert chemical weapons production. The OPCW has played an important role in reinforcing the norm against the use of chemical weapons. Chemical weapons are considered to be illegitimate tools in the conduct of contemporary warfare and states, faced with the prospect of losing international support, refrain from their usage. The Academic Forum concluded that the OPCW should indeed continue to play a leading role in countering covert chemical weapons production.

Although substantial progress has been made in the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, some countries are behind schedule, most notably the US and Russia. Albania is the one exception, as it completed the destruction of its chemical weapon stockpiles this year. Despite the fact that all State Parties have committed to destroy their chemical weapon-stockpiles by 2012, it is unlikely that they will be able to meet the deadline for various reasons. These reasons primarily consist of insufficient funding, technical difficulties, chemical weapons-destruction related accidents resulting in increasing attention for public health issues, and lack of political will on the part of some of the State Parties. Moreover, some chemical weapon stockpile locations, such as for instance sea dumps, are difficult to reach, and this further complicates destruction efforts.

While a very large number of states have signed the CWC, its membership is not universal: seven states have yet to sign the Convention. With regards to the progress made in implementing the regulations codified in the CWC, huge discrepancies exist in the depth and scope of implementation between the different State Parties. Over half of the CWC member states have so far failed to provide the legal framework to regulate the import and export of chemicals and related technology, and in many countries no licensing regime is yet in place. Universal adherence to and strict national implementation of the CWC are also deemed to be vital in meeting the threat of the use of toxic chemicals by terrorist organizations. In their absence, terrorist organizations will find it easier to acquire a chemical weapon capability. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the CWC was not designed as a counter-terrorist convention. As such, the CWC focuses on the production of militarily significant quantities of chemical agents and not on smaller quantities which might be useful to terrorist organizations. Within the current verification regime, it is impossible to guarantee that a diversion of a kilogramme of quantities of key toxic chemicals will be detected.

Rapid developments in science and technology have complicated the nature of the work of the OPCW. They require a broadening of the scope of the inspection regime as new chemical agents – which are not covered in the CWC Annex on chemicals – see the light, but also allow for new modes of detection through the introduction of new inspection-tools, such as new decontaminating methods which are based on enzyme-technology.

One of the main developments in the field of science and technology is the increasing convergence of chemistry and biology, resulting, among other things, in different synthesis routes to existent toxics, and opening up the possibility of new, laboratory-designed toxics. Discoveries in nanotechnology offer additional possibilities to assist in dispersal methods. Furthermore, the introduction of micro-reactors allow for safe, small-scale production of chemical agents, which is easy to hide and thus more difficult to detect. The globalization of chemical industry, with thousands of facilities spread all over the world, is a challenge to the inspection regime and provides an increased logistical burden to the OPCW. At the same time, breakthroughs in science and technology also allow for safer and more environmental-friendly ways of destruction of chemical weapon-stockpiles.

Against the background of the findings of the four workshops, the participants produced a list of recommendations outlining their view on the role of the OPCW in ensuring continuing progress in the implementation of the CWC.

Recommendations

Despite the considerable progress made in the destruction of chemical weapons, over two thirds of the world’s stockpiles have not yet been destroyed. The OPCW should continue its efforts to encourage member states to allocate sufficient funding in order to increase the rate of CW-stockpile destruction.

States have different motivations to join the CWC; in promoting universal membership, the OPCW and its member states should seek to address these differing motivations by offering technological, economic and/or political incentives.

In addressing the proliferation of chemical weapons and the threat of the use of toxic chemicals by terrorist organizations, the OPCW should pay more attention to qualitative improvements in the actual implementation of the CWC in State Parties, in addition to efforts to broaden the circle of membership.

In the light of the rapid advances in the field of science and technology, the General Purpose Criterion of the CWC should be restated as the protection against future scientific, technological and political developments.

In preparing for the future, the OPCW should look at how other international organizations adapted to a changing environment, such as for instance the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OPCW should create a centre of excellence, establishing a knowledge base from which all stakeholders are able to draw technical expertise and assistance. Furthermore, the OPCW should build mechanisms for cooperation with governmental and non-governmental organizations governing the safe use and exchange of chemicals at the national and international level, including organizations involved in response management, such as the WHO, and professional bodies such as the International Union of Toxicology (IUTOX) and the federation of European Toxicologists and Societies of Toxicology (EUROTOX). Stakeholders from the industry should be included in this effort, which might require adaptations to the procedures of the OPCW.

The OPCW should take a leading role in the dissemination of knowledge to nurture awareness of the danger of chemicals. It should continue to highlight the relevance of the CWC to people’s safety and security, not just by embedding education on the dangers of misuse of chemicals within the narrow confines of the academic world, but by promoting education and discussion of ethical issues within broader segments of society as well.

Ultimately, however, it was recognized that the success of the OPCW remains dependent on the political will of signatory as well as non-signatory states to do what is necessary to create a world free of chemical weapons. It is to be hoped that they will help the OPCW in achieving this loft worthy objective.